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 THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR AND THE 
GRAND JURY IN POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE 
CASES: RESTORING THE GRAND JURY TO ITS 
ORIGINAL PURPOSE 
RIC SIMMONS* 
ABSTRACT 
In deciding whether and what to charge in a criminal case, the prosecutor looks 
to three different factors. The first is legal: is there probable cause that the defendant 
committed this crime? The second is practical: if the case goes to trial, will there be 
sufficient evidence to convict the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt of this 
crime? And the third is equitable: should the defendant be charged with this crime? 
The prosecutor is uniquely qualified to answer the first and second question, but the 
third is a bit trickier. If it is used properly, the grand jury could provide valuable 
guidance to the prosecutor in answering this third question. This role could be 
especially useful in police use of deadly force cases. 
To see how this would work, this Article examines three prominent police use of 
force cases and analyzes how the prosecutor used the grand jury in each case. In the 
case of the shooting of Freddie Gray in Baltimore, the prosecutor treated the grand 
jury the way most prosecutors treat grand juries—as a rubber stamp for her pre- 
existing decision to indict. The result was disastrous, as the prosecutor was unable to 
obtain a conviction against any of the police officers. In the case of the shooting of 
Tamir Rice in Cleveland, the prosecutor used the grand jury as political cover: the 
prosecutor had already decided not to indict the case and presented a weak case to 
the grand jury to ensure that the grand jury would not return an indictment. The 
subsequent reaction by the community led to the prosecutor losing his job in the next 
election. Finally, in the case of the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, the 
prosecutor decided to use the grand jury for its original purpose by allowing it to 
exercise its independent judgment as to whether an indictment was appropriate in the 
case. In doing so, he was able to reach a more just result than we saw in either of the 
other two case studies. 
This Article then discusses how to encourage police officers to follow the 
example of the Ferguson prosecutor and allow grand juries to exercise their own 
independent judgment. One of the easiest ways to accomplish this goal would be to 
relax the grand jury secrecy rules, most of which are outdated and all of which 
decrease the legitimacy of the grand jury. 
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I. THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR AND THE GRAND JURY 
A. The Prosecutor 
The prosecutor is the most powerful figure in the criminal justice system.1 No 
criminal case can begin without her, and any criminal case can end at any time based 
solely on her decision. Moreover, in the 95% of criminal cases that end in a plea 
bargain,2 it is the prosecutor who dominates the negotiation, with her hand 
strengthened by the proliferation of crimes in our penal codes and the high potential 
sentences authorized by legislatures.3 
Along with this power comes the ability to exercise discretion in each individual 
case. The prosecutor is supposed to use her training and experience to exercise this 
discretion and determine the just outcome for each case.4 However, that ideal model 
is not always borne out in practice.5 Exercising this discretion—deciding whether to 
 
 
 
 
1 See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Federal Prosecutors Have Way Too Much Power, N.Y 
TIMES (Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/08/19/do-prosecutors- 
have-too-much-power/federal-proscutors-have-way-too-much-power; Cameron Todd 
Willingham, How Prosecutors Came to Dominate the Criminal-Justice System, THE 
ECONOMIST (Oct. 4, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21621799-how- 
prosecutors-came-dominate-criminal-justice-system-kings-courtroom. As Robert Jackson, the 
former U.S. Attorney General, Supreme Court Justice, and chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg 
trials said, “The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty and reputation than any other 
person in America.” Willingham, supra note 1. 
2    Tim Lynch, The Devil’s Bargain: How Plea Agreements, Never Contemplated by the 
Framers, Undermine Justice, CATO INST. (July 2011), 
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/devils-bargain-how-plea-agreements-never- 
contemplated-framers-undermine-justice. 
3 See Gerald E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2117, 2123-29 (1998) (arguing that prosecutors have so much power that they are 
essentially administrators in an inquisitorial justice system). 
4    See H. Richard Uviller, Dispassion in a Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 
1696 (2000). 
5    See, e.g., Nick Schwellenback, Hundreds of Justice Department Attorneys Violated 
Professional Rules, Laws, or Ethical Standards, POGO (Mar. 13, 2014), 
http://www.pogo.org/our-work/reports/2014/hundreds-of-justice-attorneys-violated- 
standards.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/. 
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charge and what to charge6—is the most important role of the prosecutor, and it is a 
fundamental aspect of our criminal justice system.7 
In deciding whether and what to charge, the prosecutor looks to three different 
factors: 
(1) Legal—Is there probable cause that the defendant committed this 
crime? 
 
(2) Practical—If the case goes to trial, will there be sufficient evidence to 
convict the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt of this crime? 
 
(3) Equitable—Should the defendant be charged with this crime?8 
The prosecutor is uniquely qualified to answer the first and second question. She 
is the legal actor who is most familiar with the facts and available evidence in the 
case, and she has been trained to know what constitutes probable cause and proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. But the third question is a bit trickier.9 The prosecutor 
has some expertise in deciding what a fair and equitable charge would be based on 
her own past cases and those of others in her office. She is also (hopefully) 
responsive to the local community, whose members may care far more about 
enforcing some crimes than others. For example, in some jurisdictions, the 
community may want the prosecutor to focus on firearms possession but is not as 
concerned about marijuana possession or shoplifting. The prosecutor, or her 
supervisor, also may have her own political or personal agenda and decide to crack 
down on drug crimes, domestic violence, or white-collar crimes while saving 
resources by undercharging other types of cases. And, as this author has argued 
elsewhere,10 the grand jury conceivably could provide input on this equitable 
question, serving as the voice of the community with regard to certain types of 
crimes or to specific defendants. If a prosecutor has a particularly sympathetic 
defendant, or if the case involves significant but legally irrelevant mitigating factors, 
the prosecutor could present these facts to the grand jury to determine whether the 
grand jury still wants to go forward with the case. But for the most part, this role for 
 
 
 
6 Of course, the prosecutor exercises discretion in other ways as well—for example, in 
deciding what terms to seek (or accept) in a plea negotiation, or in recommending a specific 
sentence after conviction. But the charging decision is by far the most important, and it is the 
only one which involves the grand jury. Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive 
Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 183, 186, 189 (2007). 
7 Other actors in the criminal justice system also exercise discretion in carrying out their 
jobs—police decide whether to make an arrest; judges decide how long to sentence after 
conviction—but none of their roles is as essential as the prosecutor’s in giving the criminal 
justice system flexibility. Kevin Walsh, The Mandatory Arrest Law: Police Reaction, 16 PACE 
L. REV. 97, 105 (1995). 
8    See Uviller, supra note 4, at 1695-98. 
9 See Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Ethics and Victims' Rights: The Prosecutor's 
Duty of Neutrality, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 570 (2005); Uviller, supra note 4, at 1702- 
05. 
10    Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the 
Criminal Justice System, 82 BOS. U. L. REV. 1, 44-51 (2002). 
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the grand jury is only theoretical; in practice, the grand jury usually adds very little 
of substance to the charging decision. 
B. The Grand Jury 
The widespread impotence and irrelevance of the grand jury11 has been well 
documented elsewhere;12 this Article only reviews the highlights here. On the federal 
level, grand juries indict over 99% of the cases brought before them,13 while 
currently over half of the states do not even require a grand jury in order to initiate a 
felony case.14 In states where prosecutors do utilize a grand jury, the presentation is 
typically quick and perfunctory, involving a law enforcement officer reading a case 
file, and then the prosecutor initiates a legal charge.15 
A more interesting question is how the grand jury evolved into a mere rubber 
stamp for the prosecutor—after all, this was an institution so revered that it was 
included in the Bill of Rights and used in some administrative and quasi-legislative 
roles in the early days of the Republic.16 But two major changes have occurred over 
the centuries to siphon power away from the grand jury. The first is the rise of the 
professional prosecutor, who now essentially fulfills the grand jury’s traditional role, 
both in terms of gathering evidence and reviewing cases.17 The second is a series of 
legal changes: as professional prosecutors became more widespread, a series of 
Supreme Court cases shifted power from the grand jury to the prosecutor.18 These 
decisions gave prosecutors the right to present hearsay testimony in the grand jury,19 
held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to grand jury proceedings,20 applied a 
harmless error analysis to any procedural errors that occur during the proceedings,21 
and ruled that a prosecutor had no duty to present exculpatory evidence to a grand 
 
 
 
11    Throughout this Article, the phrase “grand jury” refers to the charging grand jury, not 
the investigative grand jury. 
12    See,  e.g.,  William  J.  Campbell,  Eliminate  the  Grand  Jury,  64  J.  CRIM.  L.  & 
CRIMINOLOGY 174 (1973). 
13 Thaddeus Hoffmeister, The Grand Jury Legal Advisor: Resurrecting the Grand Jury’s 
Shield, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1176 (2008); see generally Offices of the U.S. 
Att’y, Annual Statistical Reports, DOJ, http://www.justice.gov/usao/resources/annual- 
statistical-reports (last updated Mar. 10, 2016). 
14    SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE, § 1-7, 1-32 (2d ed. 2002). 
15    See Simmons, supra note 10, at 32. 
16    See, e.g., RICHARD G. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE’S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1634-1941 11, 16 (1963). 
17    Roger A. Fairfax Jr., Grand Jury Innovation: Toward a Functional Makeover of the 
Ancient Bulwark of Liberty, 19 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 339, 344 (2010). 
18    Id. 
19    Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956). 
20    United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974). 
21 United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 67 (1986). This means that as long as the 
grand jury convicts the defendant, he cannot challenge any procedural mistakes or 
prosecutorial misconduct in the grand jury. Id. 
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2017] ROLE OF PROSECUTOR AND GRAND JURY 523 
 
 
jury.22 Through this series of decisions, the Supreme Court made it clear that the 
courts should exercise virtually no supervision of the grand jury. This notion was 
based on the legal fiction that the grand jury was an independent body, separate from 
both the prosecutor’s office and the court system.23 As a result, in almost all 
jurisdictions, if the prosecutor wants an indictment from the grand jury, she can 
easily obtain one.24 The grand jury was originally meant to be a “shield” of 
independent citizens protecting the general public from the government’s charging 
power; today, it is simply unable to perform that function. 
This is not to say that the charging grand jury performs no useful function in the 
modern criminal justice system. Prosecutors can, and often do, use the grand jury in 
two important ways. First, if the prosecutor has a witness who may be reluctant or 
unreliable—such as in a case involving organized crime or domestic violence—she 
can call that witness to the grand jury in order to formally memorialize his 
testimony.25 The grand jury testimony is useless if the witness is unavailable at 
trial,26 but if the witness does testify at trial and changes his story or claims lack of 
memory, his prior statements before the grand jury can be admitted as substantive 
evidence.27 
Second, the prosecutor may be unsure about what a witness will say under oath 
or how he will present himself to jurors at trial.28 The prosecutor can call the witness 
before the grand jury to observe both the witness’s demeanor and the grand jurors’ 
reactions. This observation could be useful if the witness is a victim of sexual assault 
or an informant with a significant criminal history. 
However, for the most part, prosecutors in most jurisdictions29 treat grand juries 
as nothing more than rubber stamps, meaning that the grand juries serve no actual 
purpose at all. As we will see in the next section, however, cases in which police 
officers are accused of unlawful lethal use of force tend not to follow this well- 
known script. 
 
 
 
 
 
22    United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 55 (1992). 
23 Id. Justice Stevens noted in his Williams dissent that as a result of the Supreme Court’s 
rulings, federal courts have “no power to enforce the prosecutor’s obligation to protect the 
fundamental fairness of [grand jury] proceedings.” Id. at 55-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
24    Id. at 65. 
25    Id. at 62-63. 
26 See FED. R. EVID.  804(b)(1) (providing that if  a witness is unavailable, his prior 
statements under oath are admissible only if the witness had been subject to cross-examination 
when he made them). 
27    See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1). 
28 See id.; see also Peter F. Vaira, Role of the Prosecutor Inside the Grand Jury Room: 
Where is the Foul Line, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1129, 1134 (1984). 
29 There are some jurisdictions in which the procedural rules of the grand jury are more 
restrictive, which lead to prosecutors presenting a more complete version of the case to the 
grand jury. Simmons, supra note 10, at 16-29 (examining the differences between the New 
York grand jury and the federal grand jury). 
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II. THE ROLE OF THE GRAND JURY IN POLICE LETHAL USE OF FORCE CASES: 
THREE CASE STUDIES 
Police lethal use of force cases are challenging for prosecutors for a number of 
reasons. First, these cases tend to be high-profile, and publicity always creates extra 
challenges for criminal cases. For example, the jury pool may be tainted, and the 
prosecutor’s actions and statements will come under intense scrutiny, which may 
result in decisions that are less just or less strategically sound.30 Second, prosecutors 
work closely with the police, so there may be a conflict of interest when the 
prosecutor needs to exercise her judgment as to whether to bring charges against a 
police officer.31 Third, even if a prosecutor decides to bring charges and aggressively 
prosecutes the case, such cases are very difficult to win.32 There are various reasons 
for this, but for the most part, it appears that jurors are reluctant to second-guess the 
split-second decisions that police officers must exercise in life-or-death situations.33 
Cases involving police lethal use of force are also unusual because grand juries 
tend not to indict these cases.34  This low indictment rate is somewhat puzzling at 
 
 
30    Id. at 8. 
31 See generally Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 
1447 (2016) (discussing the issues prosecutors face when bringing charges against police 
officers). 
32 The Washington Post tracked twenty-three trials of police officers between 2005 and 
2015 and found that seventeen of the twenty-three resulted in an acquittal. Police Officers 
Prosecuted For Use of Deadly Force, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/police-shootings/; see also Kevin 
Gresha et al., After Tensing Mistrial, What Will Deters Do Next?, CINCINNATI.COM (Nov. 13, 
2016), http://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/tensing/2016/11/12/tensing-jury-continue- 
deliberations-saturday/93671484/. Most recently, Officer Ray Densing in Cincinnati was 
charged with murder and voluntary manslaughter for killing a black motorist who tried to 
drive away from a traffic stop. Gresha et al., supra note 32. Densing’s body camera captured 
the entire encounter on video, and the case appeared to be very strong supporting a conviction 
of one of the two charges. Id. Furthermore, the chief prosecutor made clear in public 
statements that he was aggressively pursuing a conviction. Id. However, after three days of 
deliberation, the jury deadlocked, with four jurors voting for acquittal on all charges and nine 
jurors voting for acquittal on the murder charges. Id. 
33 Emily Shapiro & Julia Jacobo, Why It May Be Hard to Convict an Officer in Cases of 
Police-Involved Deaths, ABC NEWS (Dec. 7, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/US/jurors- 
reluctant-convict-police-cases-officer-involved-deaths/story?id=44008416; Tracy Wood, 
Reluctant Juries Often Make Prosecuting Police Difficult, VOICE OF OC (Sept. 22, 2011), 
http://voiceofoc.org/2011/09/reluctant-juries-often-make-prosecuting-police-difficult/. 
34    James C. McKinley, Jr. & Al Baker, Grand Jury System, with Exceptions, Favors the 
Police in  Fatalities, N.Y.  TIMES(Dec.  7, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/08/nyregion/grand-juries-seldom-charge-police-officers-in- 
fatal-actions.html  (citing  Phil  Stinson,  Police  Integrity  Lost:  Police  Crimes  Involving 
Firearms,  BOWLING GREEN  ST.  U. (Aug. 20, 2014), 
https://blogs.bgsu.edu/pilproject/2014/08/20/police-crime-involving-firearms/).  The  research 
shows 2,600 “justifiable police homicides” from 2004-2011, with only forty-one officers 
charged with murder or manslaughter over that period. Id. Investigations in specific cities 
support the view that most of these decisions not to charge are processed through a grand jury: 
in Houston, grand juries have not indicted a single Houston police officer between 2009 and 
2014, even though over thirty unarmed civilians were shot in that five-year period. James 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss4/7
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first. Although these cases are harder to win at trial, they are not inherently harder to 
indict: the legal rules that apply to the prosecutor and the grand jury are just as 
lenient in police lethal use of force cases as they are in every other criminal case.35 In 
other words, the prosecutor could get an indictment in nearly every single police 
lethal use of force case if she wanted to do so. Thus, the reason for lower indictment 
rates is not because the grand jury is acting as a neutral shield against overzealous 
prosecution; that role disappeared decades ago and is unlikely to ever return.36 
Instead, the lower indictment rates in cases involving police lethal use of force 
are evidence that prosecutors are using the grand juries to perform some other 
function. Exactly what that function is depends on the prosecutor’s motive. This 
Article argues that there are two possible functions that a grand jury could provide in 
police lethal use of force cases: 
(1) The prosecutor is using the grand jury as political cover, so that a 
prosecutor who does not want to move forward can claim that the 
potentially unpopular decision not to press charges was made by the 
grand jury. 
 
(2) The prosecutor is using the grand jury to guide her exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion by obtaining feedback from the community 
about the strength of the case and the equitable decision of whether 
charges are appropriate.37 
In order to understand and evaluate these two possible functions, this Article will 
examine three different cases in which a grand jury considered a police lethal use of 
force case. 
 
 
 
 
 
Pinkerton, Bulletproof: Part 3: Hard to Charge, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, 
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/local/investigations/item/Bulletproof-Part-3-Hard-to- 
charge-24421.php (last visited Mar. 12, 2017). In Dallas, grand juries considered charges in 
eighty-one police shootings between 2008 and 2012 and only indicted one officer. Id. 
35 Ben Casselman, It’s Incredibly Rare for a Grand Jury to Do What Ferguson’s Just Did, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 24, 2014, 9:30 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/ferguson- 
michael-brown-indictment-darren-wilson. 
36 It is also a role which the grand jury is not particularly qualified to fulfill because it is 
made up of lay people who have no training or experience in determining whether probable 
cause does in fact exist in a particular case. 
37 One journalist sees three possible reasons for the low  indictment  rates  of  police 
officers. Casselman, supra note 35. The first is juror bias, meaning that jurors are reluctant to 
second-guess police officers when they use force. Id. This is certainly a reason why these 
cases are harder to win at trial, but given the massive procedural advantages prosecutors enjoy 
in the grand jury, it does not explain low indictment rates. Id. The second is prosecutorial bias: 
prosecutors intentionally present a less compelling case. Id. And the third is public pressure: 
prosecutors feel they have to bring a case in front of a grand jury even though they know it is 
weak. Id. The second two reasons are actually describing the same phenomenon—what I call 
“political cover”: the prosecutor feels public pressure to bring charges, but does not want to 
bring charges (either because of pro-police bias or because the case is not strong), and so the 
prosecutor intentionally makes a weak presentation to the grand jury. 
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A. Freddie Gray: Grand Jury Business as Usual 
One category of police lethal use of force cases involves situations where the 
prosecutor treats the grand jury the same as always: a rubber stamp to automatically 
approve of charges upon which she has already decided. There is nothing inherently 
unethical or inappropriate about this course of action, as it is standard procedure for 
the vast majority of criminal cases that come before a grand jury, but it represents a 
lost opportunity to make use of the grand jury. As the first case study makes clear, 
that lost opportunity can lead to embarrassing failures at the trial level. 
On April 12, 2015, the Baltimore police arrested Freddie Gray for allegedly 
possessing an illegal switchblade knife.38 The police placed Gray into a transport van 
and drove him unrestrained through the city for approximately half an hour.39 By the 
end of the drive, Gray was in a coma from injuries suffered during the transport, and 
he died of these injuries one week later.40 
The prosecutor in the case, Baltimore City Attorney Marilyn Mosby, 
immediately announced that she was going  to bring charges against six  police 
officers for their role in Gray’s death.41 Her assistant prosecutors presented evidence 
to a grand jury for two weeks and obtained against all six defendants indictments 
including charges nearly identical to the ones that Mosby had originally sought.42 
The cases were brought to trial a few months later. The prosecutor’s results were 
with disastrous: the first trial ended in a mistrial while the next three resulted in 
acquittals. The prosecutor ultimately dismissed the charges against the remaining 
defendants.43 
Defenders of Mosby’s decision argue that it is always difficult to convict police 
officers for these kinds of crimes and that she was correct to respond to the clear 
preferences of the community that she represented by bringing these cases to trial.44 
Conversely, Mosby’s critics respond that the case was overcharged in response to 
political pressure and that she abdicated her duty to exercise her own independent 
legal judgment in determining whether she did in fact have the evidence necessary to 
 
 
38    Sarah Almukhtar et al., Freddie Gray Case Ends with No Convictions of Any Police 
Officers, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/04/30/us/what-happened-freddie-gray-arrested-by- 
baltimore-police-department-map-timeline.html. 
39    Id. 
40    Id.; see also Freddie Gray’s Death in Police Custody: What We Know, BBC NEWS 
(May 23, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-32400497. 
41    Wil  S.  Hylton,  Baltimore  vs.  Marilyn  Mosby,  N.Y.  TIMES   (Sept.  28,  2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/02/magazine/marilyn-mosby-freddie-gray-baltimore.html. 
42 Grand Jury Indicts Baltimore Police in Death of Freddie Gray, GMA NEWS (May 22, 
2015), http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/491162/news/world/grand-jury-indicts- 
baltimore-police-in-death-of-freddie-gray. The grand jury charged the six officers with 
twenty-five crimes, from reckless endangerment against all the officers to second-degree 
depraved heart murder for the most culpable. Id. It did not bring an indictment for false 
imprisonment, although Mosby had reportedly sought to charge two officers with that crime. 
Almukhtar et al., supra note 38. 
43    Id. 
44    Hylton, supra note 41. 
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convict in this situation.45 Regardless of either position, there is no question that she 
overreached in her charging decision. When a prosecutor charges a defendant with 
murder and cannot even obtain a reckless endangerment conviction, she has 
obviously miscalculated the situation. As we have seen, this type of miscalculation is 
not uncommon in police lethal use of force cases. 
B. Tamir Rice: Grand Jury as Political Cover 
Although Mosby has been roundly criticized for exercising poor judgment and 
possibly allowing political considerations to affect her prosecutorial discretion, she 
at least acknowledged the decision as her own and took responsibility for it. 
Unfortunately, police lethal use of force cases are so politically-charged that not 
every prosecutor has such principles, and the grand jury gives such prosecutors a 
convenient way to avoid accountability. 
In a second category of police lethal use of force cases, the prosecutor does not 
want to indict the case, but she does not have the political will to take responsibility 
for that decision. Thus, she intentionally presents a weak case to the grand jury, 
which leads the grand jury to issue a no true bill. The prosecutor can then 
disingenuously respond to the community that the decision to charge a defendant 
rests with the grand jury, and in this case, the grand jury refused to indict the case. 
In Ohio, Cuyahoga County Prosecutor Timothy McGinty took this course of 
action when he handled Officer Timothy Loehmann’s shooting of twelve-year old 
Tamir Rice. On November 22, 2014, Officer Loehmann and his partner Frank 
Garmack responded to a 911 call that reported a person was sitting on a swing in a 
public park in Cleveland, Ohio, pointing a gun at people.46 As the police car pulled 
up to Tamir Rice in the park, Officer Loehmann saw that Rice was holding what 
appeared to be a gun, and within two seconds, the officer fatally shot the child.47 The 
item in Rice’s hand turned out to be a realistic-looking toy replica of a gun.48 
Prosecutor McGinty took no official action on the case for many months, as he 
was waiting first for a lengthy police investigation to be completed, and then he 
commissioned two outside experts on police use of force who were widely 
considered to have a pro-police bias.49 In response to a citizen’s petition, a Municipal 
Court Judge determined that there was probable cause to charge Officer Loehmann 
with a number of crimes, including murder, but the prosecutor still failed to bring the 
case to a grand jury until late October 2015, eleven months after the shooting.50 
 
 
45    Id. 
46    Elahe Izade & Peter Holley, Video Shows Cleveland Officer Shooting 12-Year-Old 
Tamir Rice Within Seconds, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/11/26/officials-release-video- 
names-in-fatal-police-shooting-of-12-year-old-cleveland-boy/?utm_term=.e9329c0abc8e. 
47    Id. 
48    Id. 
49 Cory Shaffer, Grand Jury Hearing Evidence in Tamir Rice Shooting, CLEVELAND.COM 
(Oct. 27, 2015), 
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2015/10/grand_jury_hearing_evidence_in.html. 
50 Cory Shaffer, Tamir Rice Shooting Was Tragic but Reasonable: Prosecution Experts, 
CLEVELAND.COM (Oct. 10, 2015), 
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2015/10/tamir_rice_shooting_was_tragic.html. 
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As the Gray case (and countless others) have shown, a prosecutor can obtain an 
indictment for any case if he or she chooses to do so. However, Prosecutor McGinty 
did not conduct Loehmann’s possible indictment as an ordinary grand jury 
presentation. Independent reports from witnesses who testified in the Rice grand jury 
show that the prosecutors were acting more like defense attorneys, aggressively 
cross-examining the witnesses who argued that the killing was unjustified.51 
Meanwhile, the two defendant-officers were invited to the grand jury to read 
exculpatory statements and were not cross-examined at all.52 The result was 
predictable: after two months of hearing evidence, the grand jury did not indict the 
case.53 The most reasonable explanation for the grand jury’s failure to indict is that 
the prosecutor did not want an indictment, but he also did not want to take 
responsibility for that decision himself. Instead, he used the grand jury as a 
convenient tool to take responsibility for the decision; at the end of the process, he 
could point to the grand jury as evidence that no charges were appropriate in the 
case. “If you don’t trust the grand jury,” McGinty explained, “you don’t trust your 
neighbors.”54 
The prosecutor’s actions in the Tamir Rice shooting case were the polar opposite 
of those that the prosecutor took in Freddie Gray’s case. Here, in the Tamir Rice 
case, was a prosecutor who, unlike Mosby in Gray’s case, apparently did not believe 
that the officers should be charged but also, unlike Mosby, refused to take 
responsibility for the decision on his own. McGinty’s use of the grand jury for this 
purpose was dishonest, and the extreme measures he took to accomplish this purpose 
made his dishonesty transparent to the community. Less than three months after the 
grand jury failed to indict the officers in the Rice case, Cuyahoga County residents 
voted McGinty out of office.55 
C. Michael Brown: Grand Jury as a Legitimate Community Voice 
In the Gray case, the grand jury served no actual purpose, and in the Rice case, 
the institution was used for political cover. However, as alluded to earlier, the grand 
jury can still perform a useful and legitimate task in these cases, so long as the 
prosecutor is willing to let that happen. If given a chance, a grand jury is perfectly 
capable of evaluating the strength of a case and deciding whether charging the 
defendant  is  justifiable  on  equitable  grounds.  All  that  is  necessary  is  for  the 
 
 
51    Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Mitch Smith, Tamir Rice's Family Clashes with Prosecutor 
Over Police Killing, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/24/us/tamir-rices-family-and-prosecutor-quarrel-over- 
release-of-evidence.html. 
52 Emily Shapiro, Grand Jury Declines to Indict Officers in Tamir Rice Case, Prosecutor 
Says, ABC NEWS (Dec.  28, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/US/prosecutor-make- 
announcement-tamir-rice-grand-jury-investigation/story?id=35977877. 
53 See Ashley Fantz, et al., Tamir Rice Shooting: No Charges for Officers, CNN (Dec. 28, 
2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/28/us/tamir-rice-shooting/index.html. 
54 Sean Flynn, The Tamir Rice Story: How to Make a Police Shooting Disappear, GQ 
(July 14, 2016), http://www.gq.com/story/tamir-rice-story. 
55 Phillip Morris, Voters Dumped Tim McGinty for the Devil They Don’t Know, 
CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 18, 2016), 
http://www.cleveland.com/morris/index.ssf/2016/03/voters_dumped_tim_mcginty.html. 
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prosecutor to present a complete, unbiased case to the grand jury rather than the bare 
bones evidence that is usually presented. In modern times, the duties of evaluating 
the strength of the case and deciding whether to charge belong to the prosecutor. 
But, this reality does not prevent the prosecutor from turning to the grand jury for an 
advisory opinion on the questions. This is arguably what occurred in Ferguson, 
Missouri, when the prosecutor had to decide whether to charge Officer Darren 
Wilson with the killing of Michael Brown. 
The case began on August 9, 2014, when Officer Wilson shot Michael Brown in 
the street.56 Prosecutor Robert McCulloch took the case to the grand jury on August 
20, eleven days after the shooting.57 The prosecutors presented the grand jury with 
over sixty witnesses over a three-month period, and the defendant himself testified 
and was subject to cross-examination.58  After the grand jury returned a no true bill, 
McCulloch released nearly the entire transcript of the grand jury proceedings to the 
public.59 
The shooting of Michael Brown represented a very challenging case for the 
prosecutor. Various eyewitnesses, including the defendant himself, gave different 
recollections of the nature of the confrontation between Wilson and Brown.60 The 
community of Ferguson underwent weeks of protests, some of them violent, and the 
case attracted national attention.61 Given the conflicting testimony, it was hard to 
determine whether the evidence would support a guilty verdict at trial or even 
whether a crime occurred at all. Given the complex political and social repercussions 
of the event, it was hard to determine whether, even if Officer Wilson technically 
could be convicted of a crime, it was appropriate to charge him with one. A 
prosecutor certainly has the duty to make these decisions, and she certainly has the 
right to do so without any meaningful input from the grand jury, as Mosby did in 
Baltimore.62 However, a more sensible course of action is for the prosecutor to use 
the grand jury to advise in these determinations. Then, if the case does go forward, a 
complete and unbiased presentation to the grand jury can provide the prosecutor with 
valuable feedback on the potential weak points that need to be strengthened before 
trial. 
 
 
56 What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-after- 
police-shooting.html. 
57 Anya Van Wagtendonk, Grand Jury Won't Indict Officer in Michael Brown Death, 
PBS NEWSHOUR (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/grand-jury-decides- 
not-to-indict-darren-wilson-in-shooting-death-of-michael-brown/. 
58    Editorial, The Grand Jury Says No. Now St. Louis Must Make the Most of It, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH     (Nov.    24,    2014),    http://www.stltoday.com/news/opinion/columns/the- 
platform/editorial-the-grand-jury-says-no-now-st-louis-must/article_44813b31-abc9-5280- 
ab8f-4ce23859fba7.html [hereinafter The Grand Jury Says No]. 
59    Erik Echkholm, Witnesses Told Grand Jury That Michael Brown Charged at Darren 
Wilson, Prosecutor Says, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/witnesses-told-grand-jury-that-michael-brown- 
charged-at-darren-wilson-prosecutor-says.html. 
60    Id. 
61    The Grand Jury Says No, supra note 58. 
62    See discussion supra Sections I.A-B. 
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III. RECLAIMING THE GRAND JURY AS A LEGITIMATE VOICE OF THE COMMUNITY 
These case studies are not atypical. Cases involving police lethal use of force 
routinely challenge prosecutors. Often, political pressure compels prosecutors to 
bring charges that they cannot prove at trial. On other occasions, prosecutors do not 
want to bring charges—perhaps for legitimate reasons—but are unwilling to take 
responsibility for that decision. In both cases, the legitimacy of the grand jury 
suffers. In the first case, the grand jury is (rightfully) seen as a passive tool of the 
prosecutor, willing to approve any criminal charge no matter how problematic the 
case might be. In the second case, the prosecutor uses the grand jury as a scapegoat 
and portrays it as an unaccountable, anonymous body that considers evidence in 
secret before issuing unpopular decisions. Neither of these two options is helpful to 
the image of the grand jury or of the criminal justice system as a whole. 
Instead, prosecutors should feel compelled to use the grand jury to assist them in 
their exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Some prosecutors, like Robert McCullough 
in Ferguson, have recognized the value of grand juries in these situations, but most 
prosecutors have not. Thus, in order to encourage prosecutors to use grand juries 
fairly and effectively, there should be increased transparency in the process. 
Transparency will deter prosecutors from intentionally making weak presentations to 
the grand jury, and it will clarify the role that grand juries play in the charging 
decision. 
Traditionally, the secrecy of the grand jury process has been considered critical 
to the grand jury’s independence. In truth, secrecy merely contributes to the 
prosecutor’s total control over the grand jury. Although wholesale reform of the 
grand jury may be politically  impossible, smaller scale changes to the secrecy 
provision could be feasible, especially in the context of police lethal use of force 
cases. 
A. Costs of Secrecy 
Grand jury secrecy is venerated as one of the most fundamental aspects of the 
institution. This secrecy was initially created to maintain the independence of the 
grand jury. Originally, even the prosecutor was not permitted in the grand jury 
because the grand jury was supposed to run independently from all government 
bodies.63 However, as the criminal justice system has evolved and the prosecutor has 
gained more control over the grand jury, courts have turned to other reasons to 
justify grand jury secrecy. In modern times, courts cite five different justifications 
for grand jury secrecy: 
(i) To prevent the escape of the defendant; 
 
(ii) To prevent tampering with the grand jurors; 
 
(iii) To prevent tampering with witnesses before trial; 
 
(iv) To  encourage  open  and  honest  testimony  from  grand  jury 
witnesses; 
 
 
 
63    Richard Calkins, The Fading Myth of Grand Jury Secrecy, 1 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & 
PROC. 18, 18-19 (1967-68). 
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(v) To protect the reputation of those who are not indicted.64 
Most of these justifications have merit while a grand jury is actively considering 
a case,  but after the grand jury has indicted a case,  only the  third and fourth 
justifications remain relevant. Nevertheless, even those two justifications do not 
carry much weight after the grand jury has made its decision because the 
justifications rely on the presumption that the names and statements of the witnesses 
will always remain confidential. In reality, most court rules require the prosecutor to 
turn over witness lists prior to trial, and the defendant ultimately has the right to see 
the prior statements of all witnesses who will testify against him.65 Some rules only 
require that these statements be turned over after the trial witness testifies, but in 
practice, these statements are frequently turned over to the defense prior to trial.66 
Thus, the concerns about preventing witness tampering or encouraging honest 
testimony only apply to grand jury witnesses who are not expected to testify at 
trial—a very rare circumstance. 
Of course, most felony cases do not ever go to trial as over 90% of them plead 
out.67 Thus, most witnesses in the grand jury ultimately will not have their names or 
testimony disclosed to the defendant. However, the prosecutor cannot guarantee this 
fact to any of the witnesses at the time of the grand jury proceeding. It is unlikely 
that a witness will feel more comfortable being open and honest because their names 
and statements probably will not be released to the defendant. 
On the other hand, if the grand jury votes not to indict the case, then the third and 
fourth justifications do not apply at all, but the fifth justification (protecting the 
reputation of the innocent) remains important. However, cases involving police 
lethal use of force almost always involve a high level of publicity, and the media 
already will have reported the name of the defendant-police officer. Keeping the 
grand jury proceedings secret under these circumstances after the grand jury has 
voted not to indict the case does nothing to protect the reputation of the target of the 
investigation. 
B. Benefits of Transparency 
In short, in cases involving police lethal use of force, there are no real benefits to 
maintaining grand jury secrecy after the grand jury has made its decision. On the 
other hand, the costs of maintaining secrecy are substantial. Transparency and open 
proceedings are an important part of our criminal justice system. More transparency 
enhances accountability among all actors in the grand jury process, and more open 
 
 
64 See, e.g., United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 n.6 (1958). For a 
detailed discussion of the evolution of the justifications for grand jury secrecy, see Fred A. 
Bernstein, Behind the Gray Door: Williams, Secrecy, and the Federal Grand Jury, 69 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 563, 594-603. 
65 Micah Schwartzbach, Criminal Discovery: The Right to Evidence Disclosure, 
LAWYERS.COM (Jan. 27, 2016), http://criminal.lawyers.com/criminal-law-basics/criminal-law- 
right-to-evidence-disclosure.html; see also Paul Bergman, Discovery: What and When the 
Prosecution Must Disclose, NOLO.COM, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/what-when- 
the-prosecution-must-disclose.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2017). 
66    See FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2; see also Bergman, supra note 65. 
67 Lindsey Devers, Plea and Charge Bargaining Research  Summary,  BJA  (Jan.  24, 
2011), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf. 
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proceedings lead to a greater public understanding of the role of the grand jury. In 
contrast, the secret nature of the proceedings leads to public mistrust of the grand 
jury, a loss of legitimacy for the institution, and the potential of abuse by 
prosecutors.68 
Today, the primary consequence of grand jury secrecy is that it maintains the 
prosecutor’s power over the institution.69 Because of the lack of evidentiary rules in 
the grand jury and the absence of any judicial review of the proceedings, the 
prosecutor has an extraordinary amount of power in the grand jury.70 The secrecy 
provisions reinforce this power, giving the prosecutor nearly unfettered discretion to 
conduct the grand jury in any way she believes to be appropriate, with no oversight 
from the courts or the public. 
Liberalizing grand jury secrecy rules does not have to be a radical proposition. 
There are some aspects of grand jury secrecy that are well-founded, such as keeping 
the names, deliberations, and votes of grand jurors confidential. There is no real cost 
to these types of secrecy, and disclosure of any of this information could conceivably 
disrupt the grand jury’s ability to work fairly and impartially. Furthermore, reform 
measures could liberalize grand jury secrecy rules only in certain types of cases in 
which the cost of the secrecy is high and the benefits of liberalizing are considerable. 
Prosecutors also could make motions to protect certain other types of confidential 
information, such as the names of undercover police officers or the names of sexual 
assault victims, on a case-by-case basis. Finally, the procedure for releasing grand 
jury transcripts could be carefully designed to avoid opening up a floodgate of 
demands for every case that is brought in front of the grand jury. For example, the 
rules could be amended to create a presumption of secrecy but allow a member of 
the public to overcome that presumption if he or she could demonstrate that release 
of the transcript were in the public interest.71 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The current lack of transparency in grand jury proceedings not only encourages 
illegitimate uses of the grand jury, but it also makes it difficult to evaluate whether 
 
 
68 Randall Eliason, In Defense of the Grand Jury (Part 2): Grand Jury Secrecy, SIDEBARS 
(May 25, 2016), https://sidebarsblog.com/2016/05/25/grand-jury-secrecy-in-defense-of-the- 
grand-jury-part-2/; see also Lisa H. Wallach, Prosecutorial Misconduct in the Grand Jury: 
Dismissal of Indictments Pursuant to the Federal Supervisory Power, FORDHAM L. REV. 129, 
134- 41 (1987). 
69 Note, Restoring Legitimacy: Grand Jury as the Prosecutor’s Administrative Agency, 
130 HARV. L. REV. 1205 (Feb. 10, 2017), http://harvardlawreview.org/2017/02/restoring- 
legitimacy/. 
70    Wallach, supra note 68, at 129-32. 
71 The Supreme Court’s 2016 Task Force to Examine Improvements to the Ohio Grand 
Jury System recently included such a proposal in its recent recommendations. It proposed 
amending Criminal Rule 6 of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure to allow any member of 
the public to move to release the grand jury transcript if (1) the grand jury did not indict the 
case; (2) the presumption of secrecy was outweighed by the public interest in disclosure; and 
(3) a significant number of members of the general public were aware of the investigation and 
the names of the subjects. See OHIO SUP. CT., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK 
FORCE TO EXAMINE IMPROVEMENTS TO THE OHIO GRAND JURY SYSTEM 14-15 (2016), 
https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Publications/grandJuryTF/report.pdf. 
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the prosecutor is engaged in such practices. For example, after Officer Daniel 
Pantaleo killed Eric Garner in Staten Island, New York, the prosecutor’s presentation 
to the grand jury lasted over eight weeks.72 The grand jury heard from twenty-two 
civilian witnesses, saw three different videos of the encounter, and heard from the 
defendant himself, who testified for two hours.73 In the end, the grand jury returned a 
no true bill.74 
Given the large amount of evidence that the prosecutor provided the grand jury in 
the Garner case, it is possible that the prosecutor legitimately was trying to obtain the 
grand jury’s independent judgment about whether the case should go forward. But, 
such an interpretation of the investigation is called into question by the prosecutor’s 
disingenuous statements. After the case, the prosecutor said that in New York, the 
Assistant District Attorney never “attempt[s] to influence the decision” of grand 
juries.75 Yet, in the vast majority of cases, prosecutors obviously attempt to persuade 
the grand jury to indict the case. Without any disclosure of the transcripts of the 
grand jury, it is impossible to know whether the prosecutor intentionally tried to 
dissuade the grand jury from indicting the case or, instead, legitimately gave the 
grand jury the discretionary power that it has historically wielded. 
Indeed, there are some commentators who argue that the Ferguson grand jury 
that refused to indict Darren Wilson was merely used for political cover.76 For 
example, Professor Trachtenberg argues that the Ferguson prosecutor “abdicated the 
usual role of the prosecutor, choosing instead to delegate his responsibilities to 
untrained citizens with inadequate guidance.”77 However, Professor Trachtenberg’s 
assertion misunderstands—and perhaps underestimates—the potential of grand 
jurors to provide useful guidance when they are given the proper information. When 
Robert McCulloch “delegated” the case to the grand jury, he was not abdicating his 
responsibility; instead, he using one of a prosecutor’s most valuable and under- 
utilized tools in exercising that responsibility. McCulloch’s decision to release the 
 
 
 
72 Andrew Siff et al., Grand Jury Declines to Indict NYPD Officer in Eric Garner 
Chokehold Death, NBC N.Y. (Dec 3, 2014), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Grand- 
Jury-Decision-Eric-Garner-Staten-Island-Chokehold-Death-NYPD-284595921.html. 
73    David Goodman & Al Baker, Wave of Protests After Grand Jury Doesn’t Indict Officer 
in Eric Garner Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/nyregion/grand-jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-staten- 
island-chokehold-death-of-eric-garner.html. 
74    Siff et al., supra note 72. 
75 Statement by Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., Richmond Cty. Dist. Att'y, Regarding the No 
True Bill in The Matter of the Investigation into the Death of Eric Garner (Dec. 3, 2014); see 
also Ben Trachtenberg, No, You “Stand Up”: Why Prosecutors Should Stop Hiding Behind 
Grand Juries, 80 MO. L. REV. 1099, 1101-02 (2015) (arguing that the prosecutor’s statements 
“provide[] strong evidence that [the prosecutor] did not recommend to the Richmond County 
grand jury that it indict, or that it decline to indict, Pantaleo”). 
76 Trachtenberg, supra note 75, at 1109 (arguing that the Ferguson prosecutor had already 
made up his mind not to indict Wilson before the grand jury released its decision, and at that 
point, “[h]e . . . should have stood up and announced his decision to the public—whether in 
writing, at a press conference, or both—instead of hiding behind a dozen anonymous 
citizens”). 
77    Id. at 1100. 
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grand jury transcript clarifies the situation by allowing the community to evaluate 
the prosecutors’ behavior in the grand jury and determine whether a complete and 
unbiased case was presented and whether the grand jury received sufficient guidance 
to make an accurate decision. 
A prosecutor’s actions in cases involving police  officers as defendants will 
always be  somewhat open to suspicion. Prosecutors are dependent upon police 
officers in order to do their job effectively, and so, many argue that it is impossible 
for prosecutors to impartially handle a case fairly when an officer is a defendant.78 
The absolute secrecy of the grand jury process only serves to exacerbate suspicions. 
Indeed, at least one state has recently banned the use of grand juries in cases of 
police lethal use of force to ensure that the prosecutor’s decision-making process is 
fully transparent.79 Similarly, another prosecutor in a high-profile police shooting 
case has announced that he will bypass grand juries in all such cases because of their 
lack of transparency and accountability.80 But these solutions go in the wrong 
direction. If the grand jury’s lack of transparency is the problem, the answer is not to 
ban the grand jury. The solution is to increase the level of its transparency, at least in 
the cases in which police officers are defendants.81 Greater transparency will 
encourage prosecutors to use the grand jury to guide their discretion for these very 
challenging cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
78    See,  e.g.,  Walter  Katz,  Enhancing  Accountability  and  Trust  with  Independent 
Investigations of Police Lethal Force, 128 HARV. L. REV. 235, 239 (2015); see also Steven M. 
Witzel,   Grand   Jury   Practice,   Protest,   and   Reform,   N.Y.L.J.   (Jan.   15,   2015), 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202715176527/Grand-Jury-Practice-Protests-and- 
Reform?slreturn=20170128151458. 
79 See, e.g., Allie Gross, California Becomes First State to Ban Grand Juries in Police 
Shooting Cases, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 13, 2015), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/08/california-becomes-first-state-ban-grand-juries- 
police-shooting-cases. 
80    David Chanen & Libor Jany, Hennepin County to Stop Using Grand Juries In Officer- 
Involved Shootings, STARTRIBUNE.COM (Mar. 26, 2016), 
http://www.startribune.com/hennepin-county-attorney-to-provide-update-into-jamar-clark- 
inquiry/372229891/. County Attorney Mike Freeman is in charge of a case in Minneapolis in 
which an unarmed black man, Jamar Clark, was shot by Officers Mark Ringgenberg and 
Dustin Schwarze. Id. 
81 Professor Kate Levine has suggested that lengthy, fully fleshed-out grand jury 
presentations should be the norm for all felony charging decisions, as part of a more 
comprehensive “precharge scrutiny” procedure. Kate Levine, How We Prosecute the Police, 
104 GEO L.J. 745, 770-75 (2016) (arguing that prosecutors have made a choice to “reserve 
process only for the police and a select few other suspects who have the resources to challenge 
the process at every stage”). It is unlikely that prosecutors will undergo that scale of reform, 
but increased transparency would be a feasible first step. 
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